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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LVIN ENGSTROM and

JA H. ENGSTROM,

sband and wife,

)

Respondents-Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)

LDO D. BUSHNELL and
NNA R. BUSHNELL,
iliand and wife,
Appellants-Defendants.

)

Civil No.
10954

)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS AND PIAINTIFFS
NATURE OF THE CASE
T11is case involves the interpretation of a
:iform Real Estate contract on the sale of land
Millard County by the defendants to the plain:ffs.

Plaintiffs filed this action in the District

iurt of carbon County asking the court to declare
~alid

and of no further force or effect second

1rtgages on properties in Price, carbon County,
:ah and in Orem,
~al

Utah and that funds held by a

estate agency in Burley, Idaho be declared

ibe the property of the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs

.led a motion for summary judgment on their

implaint "''hich was granted by the trial court.

:fendants appeal from that decision.

Plaintiffs

ipose this appeal and take the position that

1eir motion for summary judgment was properly

~nted

by the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendants in their statement of fact set
forth a number of claimed facts that were not
before the court on this motion for summary
judgment.

Plaintiffs motion for summary judg-

ment ·was dated May 5, 1966, and was filed May
6,

1966, and is based upon the complaint and

u.ns 1·:1eJ.:- and counterclaim of defendants and plaintiffs reply to the counterclaim with the
various

eJ~ibits

attached to these pleadings.

Answers to interrogatories and depositions were
not before the court and were not considered on
this motion for summary judgment.
The facts before the court on this motion
for summary judgment are, therefore,

limited

in accordance with these pleadings above men-

cioned

and are as hereinafter set forth.

On May 10, 1963, defendants as sellers and
plaintiffs as buyers, entered into a Uniform
~eal

Estate contract to purchase certain lands

in Millard County for the sum of $58,000 with
$500 paid at the time of the signing of the

agreement, receipt of which \·ras ac1cnowledged by
the defendants, and the balance of $57,500 to be
paid in installments, which installments are set
forth in paragraph three of the contract.

A

photocopy of this contract executed by the
pa:ccies appears as Exhibit "A" to plaintiffs
com~1laint and as pages 5 and 6 of the judgment

roll.
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On the same day plaintiffs executed a
Jn:omis::30~cy note in the amounc of $15, 500 payable

in installments in the same amount on the same
dates and bearing the same interest rate as set
j_n a portion of the second sentence in

forc~1

paj.::ag:cap11 tliree of the Uniform Real Estate Con-

!cract.

This note appeaj:-s as Exhibit "B" to

pJaintiffs complaint and is page seven of the
judgment roll.

Plaintiffs also executed a

second mortgage on properties in Utah county,
cci.;:-bon County, and at Burley, Idaho to secure
::he

pa~711lent

of this promissory note.

The des-

of these properties and the recording

c~iption

information relating to the second mortgage are
set fOJ.::th in plaintiffs complaint.
On the same date plaintiffs and defendants
21so e;:ecut.ed a supplemental agreement to the
Unifo::..:-m Real Estate Contract \·Thich provides for
t~e

pasturing of 100 head of cows and 50 head

of calves for a period of three months during
1963, and

ot~er

o::: the farm.

provisions for the operation

This supplemental agreement appears

as Exhibit A-1 to defendants answer and counter-

claim ancl is page 17 of tl.1e judgment roll.
Plaintiffs took possession of the farm on
I1aj' 10,

19 GJ and conducted farming ope rat ions

on

t~,;.c

farm during that sununer.

~o

Da::e b1e payment due on September 1, 1963 of

$3,500.
~r--ace

They were unable

After the expiration of the 30 day

perj_ocl the defendants e::ercised their

temcd-,.7 unde:_- paragrapl-1 16-A and gave a five day
3

notice of the default and stated in their
notice that if the defaults were not corrected
within the five days that the defendants as
sellers, i:lOuld declare the contract at an end
and repossess the property. This notice was
dated October 1, 1963 and appears as Exhibit "C
to plaintiffs complaint and pages 8 and 9 of the
judgment roll. The plaintiffs did not correct
ti1e default within this five day perion and
defendants too}c possession of ·the property as
set forth in the notice, which would be on
October 6, 1963. Plaintiffs have never been in
possession of the property since that date.
The Uniform Real Estate Contract in paragraph 16 provides three alternate remedies if
the buyer, who is the plaintiffs herein, fail to
maJce the payments when they became due. Subparagraph A sets forth a five day ·written notice
and a forfeiture if the defaults are-not corrected
within the five day period and a repossession of
the premises by the seller. Subparagraph B sets
forth t11at the seller may bring suit to recover
on any delinquent installment. Subparagraph C
sets forth that the seller, upon written notice
to the buyer, may declare the entire unpaid
balance due and payable and treat the contract
11

as a note and mortgage and foreclose
4

on it as a mortgage.
The plaintiffs, in filing their complaint
in Carbon County for the relief of this second
mortgage on the properties, take the position
that the defendants had a choice of remedies
as set forth above in the next preceding paragraph.

Defendants made an election as provided

under subparagraph A,

forfeited the contract

and took back the property.

By making this

election under the terms of this subparagraph
A, they are entitled to retain what was paid

clmm ·which was the $500 as liquidated damages
and that they can recover no further sums.

In

support of this claim, after defendants had
filed an answer and counterclaim and plaintiffs
J.1ad filed their reply to the counterclaim, plaintiff then filed a motion for sununary judgment
based upon these pleadings which had been filed
and the exhibits attached thereto which are
mentioned above which motion was dated May 5,
1966.

Defendants had filed their motion for a

summary judgment.

Both of these motions for

summary judgment were argued to the court on
June 21, 1966.

On August 25, 1966, District

Judge F. vl. Keller rendered a memorandum decision
v1he:;:ein he granted plaintiffs motion for a
summary judgment and denied defendants motion
for a summary judgment.

He signed such an

order on October 18, 1966.

The courts memoran-

dum decision and this order appear as further

5

additions to the judgment roll.
Defendants, upon receiving this order
granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, then filed their motion for a rehearing
which motion is dated October 24, 1966, and
filed October 26,

1966.

This motion for re-

hearing appears at page 19 of the judgment roll.
On March 21, 1967, Judge I<eller rendered a memorandum decision denying defendants motion for
rehearing and signed an order to that effect on
r1arch 24, 1967.

This order denying defendants

mo·U.on for rehearing is page 20 of the judgment
roll.

His memorandum decision appears as part

of the judgment roll, but the pages are not
numbered.
Of importance is the provision in Judge
Keller's memorandum decision dated August 25,

1966 and in his order granting plaintiffs motion
for summary judgment dated October 18, 1966,
wherein he states:
"Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
is granted provided, hov1ever, that the
relief sought by plaintiffs complaint
shall not be effective under this order
for their summary judgment until a determination of the issues can be made on
defendants counterclaim because of claimed
breaches of the supplemental agreement
therein referred to."
There are written interrogatories and answers
follouing this order granting summary judgment to
the plaintiff as discovery on this counterclaim
for claimed damages under the supplemental agree-

ment.
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On December 9, 1966, plaintiff took defendants
deposition which depositions are in the file
and have never been published and are still
sealed.

These written interrogatories and

t-he answers to them and the depositions were
all subseauent to the motion for summary judgment and a:ce not before the court and were not
considered by the court in granting sununary
judgment to the plaintiffs; therefore, all
statements in defendants brief relating to the
deposition and to answers to written interrogatories are not before the court and should not
have been included or mentioned in defendants
brief.
The issue before the court on plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment relate to the construction and legal effect of paragraph three
of the uniform real estate contract relating
to the scnedule of payments and paragraph 16 of
said contract. relating to the remedies in case of
non paymen·t.

Any damages that defendants may

be entitled to under the supplemental agreement
Hhicn is attached to defendants answer as Exhibit
i\.-1, was not determined or included in the order
granting summary judgment to plaintiff, but was
reserved for trial of the issues raised by this
supplemental agreement and for a determination
of claimed damages, if any, in favor of the
defendant.

7

ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS POINT I

~

PROMISSORY NOTE WAS A DOWNI'AYMENT
Defendants, in their argument, make a
general statement that the promissory note
was part of the downpayment under the Uniform
Real Estate Contract. Neither the contract
nor the note support this en nclusion. They
were executed on the same day and the second
~ortgage given the date to secure the promis~
sory note. When the payment schedule and the
note is compared with the payment schedule in
the contract, it appears that the note payment
schedule is the same as the first portion of
the second line in paragraph three of the contract whid1 states:
"In addition, buyers are to pay $3,500
on or before September 1, 1963, $4,000
on or before December 20, 1964, $4,000
December 20, 1965, and $4,000 on or
before December 20, 1966; ••• "
Had the promissory note been intended as a downpayment, the contract would have so recited.
The contract makes no mention of the promissory
note and only recites that $500 was paid with
the signing of the agreement.
The question of law involved and one raised
by the motion for surrunary judgment, is whether
or not the Uniform Real Estate Contract is clear
and certain as to the terms and conditions of
payment, or whether or not this portion is uncertain and ambiguous so that the parol evidence
8

would be received to explain the ambiguity.
we submit that the contract is clear and
certain on the terms and conditions of payment
and that parol evidence could not be received
to modify the terms and conditions set forth in
the contract.
An analypis of this proposition is very ably
stated by Judge Keller in his memorandum decision
of August 25 , 1966, in making the following
observations and conclusions:
"The defendants advance the claim that
this promissory note is to be considered
as a dm·m payment. In order to prevail
on this claim, the defendants have the
burden of showing that the contract of
sale is
susceptible of an interpretation that the obligation created by the
promissory note was to be considered as
a dm·m payment or that the contract is so
ambiguous as to permit the consideration
of parri evidence to show that the promissory note is to be considered as a down
payment. I conclude that there is not
upon the face of the contract any provision from which I am able to conclude that
the $15,500.00 note was to be considered
as a down payment or that there is any
ambiguity authorizing the Court to consider
parol evidence to support a conclusion
that the $15,500.00 note was a down payment.
As I examine the face of this contract
I note that the property to which it refers
is subject to an obligation to the Equitable
Life Assurance Society of the U. S. for the
sum of $35,000.00 and that this is the same
9

amount that is to be paid by the plaintiffs as is expressed in the first sentence fixing installment payments of
$4,000.00 on or before the 20th day of
December 1963, and on or before the same
date in each and every year thereafter
until $35,000.00 has been paid. It is
not an unreasonable conclusion from what
is stated in the second sentence of Par.
3 and the provisions of the note and the
security given to pay the note that the
defendants had in mind making sure that
they received something above the indebtedness on the property sold rather than a
do'ltm. payment."

ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS POINT II THE CONTRACT IS SEPARATE AND APART FROM
THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE
The argument presented in plaintiffs Point I
also applies here.
Defendants, in their brief,state at page
seven that there can be no question but what the
parties were planning for the payment of the
promissory note outside the terms of the real
estate contract and that the installment payments
on the contract can be easily distinguishable
from the payments due on the promissory note.
'de question this conclusion.

On the contrary,

the payments of the promissory note are the same
as a portion of the payments in the contract.
Defendants, at pages 8 and 9 of their brief
refer to the deposition of the defendants.

This

is improper and should not even be referred to in
the brief.

As mentioned in our statement of

facts, the depositions were taken many months
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after the motion for summary judgment was made
and was argued to the court and the court
rendered its decision granting plaintiffs motion
foramunary judgment.

The file contains the

deposition and it is still sealed and has never
been published.

It was not filed with the trial

court until June 27, 1967, after this appeal was
filed.
The proper conclusion to be drawn from the
reading of the contract, promissory note and the
second mortgages is that they are separate documents, but they refer to the same schedule of
payments.

The contract was dated May 10, 1963,

and the first payment was due September 1, 1963,
over three months from the day of the contract
and the $500 downpayrnent.
ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS POINT III DOCUMENTS CONSTRUED TOGETHER
We find no fault with the defendants claim
that these documents that were executed the same
day pertaining to the transaction should be
construed together.

This was done and these

documents taken into consideration by Judge
Keller in reaching his decision as indicated
in his memorandum decision dated March 21, 1967,
wherein 11e stated:
"I have examined the authorities
cited and have no difference with the
general principles of law stated in the
cases cited by counsel for the defendants.
In other words, I concede it to
be the law that instruments relating to
the same transaction contemporaneously
c~:ecutcd are to be construed together, and
'chat ·where the terms of the note and
11

mortgage are in conflict the terms of
the note must prevail.
The installment payments listed in
the promissory note were part of the
purchase price specified in the conditional
sales contract. As pointed out in my
original memorandum, the conditional sales
contract gives to the defendants an election of remedies. That election was
exercised when the defendants chose to repossess the real property to which it
relates upon the plaintiffs' failure to
pay the first installment specified in the
promissory note as well as in the conditional
sales. ~contract. The defendants could have
elected to declare the entire indebtedness
due and sue upon the note as well as the
contract. In stating this conclusion I am
in effect reconciling the provisions of the
note with the provisions of the conditional
sales contract in compliance with the rule
of law relied upon by the defendants to the
effect that where two instruments relating
to the same subject matter executed contemporaneously are to be construed together."
ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS POINT IV RECOVERY OF THE DOWNPAYMENT IS NOT UNCONSCION·
ABLE OR UNHEASONABLE

In defendants argument at pages 11, 12, and 1
defendants quote from Answers to Interrogatories
made by the defendants. These interrogatories
and the answers are in the same category as the
deposition. They were submitted and answered
some mon·ths after the summary judgment was granted
and they are not part of the record and the judgment roll to be considered by the court. It is
improper for the defendants to refer to these
anm·mrs to ·written interrogatories. As plaintiffs
12

vie\·1 this matter whether or not the recovery of
the dmvnpayment is unconscionable or unreasonable
is not an issue in this matter on the motion for
summary judgment.

This is a question of an elec-

tion of remedies under paragraph 16 of the Uniform
Real Estate contract.

i'n1en the plaintiffs default'

in the September 1st payment of $3,500, the defendants had a choice of three remedies under paragraph 16.

They could exercise a forfeiture and

an~take possession of the

termina·te the contract

property and retain all monies theretofore paid
as liquidated damages, or they could have brought
suit for the delinquent installment payments, or
the third remedy, declare the full amount due and
foreclose as under a real estate mortgage.

These

options are set forth clearly and with particularity in the contract.

Defendants made their

election and chose to terminate the contract and
retain all monies that had been paid as liquidated
damages as evidenced by defendants notice to the
plaintiffs dated October 1, 1963, which appears
as

E~~hibi,.::

"C" to plaintiffs complaint and is

pages 8 and 9 of the judgment roll.

The notice

itself mentions the three alternate remedies
and states that they choose the remedy to terminate
the contract.
Subpsragraph A which sets forth the remedy
chosen by the defendants has particular language
on ".-.r11at shall be forfeited as liquidated damages

for the nonperformance of the contract and states
u.s follows:
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"Seller shall have the right, upon failure
of the Buyer to remedy the default within
five days after the written notice, to be
released from all obligations in law and
in equity to convey said property, and all
payments which have been made theretofore
on this con-tract by the Buyer, shall be
forfeited to the Seller as liquidated
damages for the non performance of the
contract, ••. "
This paragraph does not refer to the down
payment as forfeited as liquidated damages, but·
states all sums that have been theretofore paid.
Defendants, in their entire brief place great
emphasis upon the language and the claim that
the promissory note is a down payment and infer
tJ.1at the dm·m payment is what is forfeited as
liquidated damages. The language of the contract
does not support the defendants in this claim.
Since $500 was the amount that had previously
been paid, this is the amount of cash that was
forfci·tcd as liquidated damages and claimed by
the defendants under their election of remedies.
Another factor that enters in is that the
defendants received more than the $500 paid at
tJ.1e ·time tJ.1e agreement was signed. The supplemental agreement referred to provides that the
plaintiffsshould furnish pasture for 100 head of
adult cattle and 50 head of calves for a total
of 150 head of cattle for the three months
during tl.1e summer growing season. This is a
substantial consideration in and of itslef and
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it is in addition to the $500 cash.
Judge Keller,

in his memorandum decision

dated March 21, 1967,

taJ~es

this proposition

into consideration in reaching his decision as
follows:
"'This is one of those causes in which the
court adopts the views of the defendants
he is compelled to conclude that breach
of the contract to sell the defendants'
ranch to the plaintiffs is far more desirable from the standpoint of the defendants
and definitely more profitable than performance. Five Hundred dollars in cash was
paid on the purchase price at the time of
·i:he e;:ecution of the contract. Simoultaneously with the e~~ecution of the contract,
the plaintiffs executed promissory notes
for tl.1e sum of fifteen thousand five hundred
dollars and secured these notes by three
separate real estate mortgages.
If the
defendants are permitted to recover on the
notes for fifteen thousand five hundred
dollars, their recovery for the breach will
amount to sixteen thousand dollars; namely,
one-third of the amount that the plaintiffs
ag:;:eed to pay for the ranch -- But this is
not all. After the execution of the contract the plaintiffs signed a supplemental
agreement that according to its terms
deprived the plaintiffs from the right to
use the proceeds from the crops grown in the:;
first year of the contract to meet the obligations of operating the ranch, deprived
them of the opportunity to plow any of the
lands in the ranch planted to grass and hay,
and permitted the defendants to pasture one
hundred head of adult cattle and fifty head
of suc1:ling calves for a period of three
mon-chs during 1963."
15

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that under Uniform Real Estate contracts
and like'l. 1ise, under Earnest Money Receipt Contracts, where there is an option and a choice of
remedies that if the seller exercises the remedy
to terminate the contract and retains the monies
that have been theretofore paid as liquidated
damages, his election is final and the vendor
cannot thereafter recover additional sums or
damages for the breach of the contract or
specific performance. See Andreasen vs. Hansen
(1959), 8 Utah 2nd 370, 335 P 2d 404; Close vs.
Blumenthall (1960), 11 Utah 2d 51, 354 P 2d 856;
HcMullin vs. Shimmin (1960), 10 Utah 2d 142, 349
p 2d 720.
1

CONCLUSION
The trial court properly granted plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment which precludes any
further payments under the contract and promissory note, but leaves open for trial the issue
of \·1he·l:her or not defendants sustained any damage
under the supplemental agreement. The trial court
decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DUANE A. FRANDSEN
of the firm of Frandsen
and Keller
Professional Building
Price, Utah
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